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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
• • j 
VIDAR KILICER, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
> Dist. Ct. No. 041904765 
> Ct. App. No. 20050406-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over this felony conviction pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Issue 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a motion to withdraw guilty pleas by a non-
citizen defendant may constitutionally - under the due process and equal protection clauses-
be deemed "untimely" when filed within a reasonable time frame of sentencing/judgment 
(as opposed to before sentence is pronounced as required by § 77-13-6(2)(b))5 even when 
it was factually impossible for the non-citizen defendant to discern trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness or the involuntariness of the pleas until after sentencing and judgment is 
pronounced and the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") files a notice of detainer 
indicating commencement of removal proceedings against the non-citizen, and where the 
- l -
non-citizen is foreclosed by law from presenting the voluntariness or ineffectiveness issue 
to any forum because of inability to appear "in person" in a post-conviction proceeding as 
a result of expeditious transfer to another state or removal from the United States by DHS. 
J?. Preservation of Issues and Propriety of Review 
The issue raised here was properly preserved below. See R. 73, n.3, and R. 98, n. 1. 
Further, the district court ruled on the issues presented in the motion to withdraw pleas, 
including the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntariness 
of defendant's pleas. See R. 100-102; cf, e.g., Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App. 631, 
Tf 4, 78 P.3d 361. Accordingly, review is proper in this Court. Further, even if not properly 
preserved in the court below, as trial counsel could not have preserved his own 
ineffectiveness for appellate review, see State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), this Court should nonetheless review the 
issues raised because of the significant constitutional implications. In the alternative, this 
Court should apply the "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" doctrine to failure to 
preserve the issues. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-12; State 
v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
C. Standard of Appellate Review 
1. The standard of review is whether the district court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements in taking guilty pleas, and is thus a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1203, 2004 UT App. 222, f^ 7; State v. 
-2-
Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 202; State v. Visser, 2001 UT App. 215, 31 P.3d 584. The 
denial of a motion to withdraw guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which 
standard incorporates the clearly erroneous standard in the factual findings sought to be 
reviewed. Smit, supra. Ultimately, whether a district court's ruling is constitutionally sound 
is a question of law reviewed de novo. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995). 
2. A plain error analysis requires this Court to view the trial record as a whole to 
determine if the claim errors seriously affected the fairness of the trial and thus review is for 
correctness. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Eldredge, 113 
P.2d 29, 35 & nn.7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. 
Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App. 186, % 6 5 P.3d 1222. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to resolving 
this case, the relevant portions of which are reproduced verbatim in Addendum E: 
United States Constitution, Amendment V; 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV; 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12; 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 24; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 etseq. (2004); 
- 3 -
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65C(k) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
On May 27, 2003, Defendant and two others allegedly conspired to rob a Pizza Hut 
and then stole items worth of over $5,000 from the store. See R.l-3, 112, at p.3. On 
November 19, 2004, Defendant entered guilty pleas in the District Court to Burglary, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, a third degree felony, and Theft, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404, a third degree felony. R.l 12, at p.4.1 
B. Course Of Proceeding and Disposition 
There were no pre-trial motions of significance filed by the parties. After entering the 
guilty pleas, the district court sentenced defendant on March 4, 2005, to two indeterminate 
prison terms of zero to five years; however, the sentences were suspended in lieu of 
probation and thirty days in jail. R. 66-69.2 Thereafter, or about April 8, 2005, Defendant 
filed a motion to withdraw guilty pleas claiming counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
misadvising him of the immigration consequences of the pleas, and because his pleas were 
involuntarily obtained. See R. 98-99. On April 14, 2005, the District Court denied 
1
 Defendant's guilty pleas may not have veen knowing and voluntary in light of his 
refusal to acknowledge that he entrered the store with intent to commit a theft. See R. 112, 
at p.3. Mr. Steven McCaughey, attorney at law, was of significant help in this brief. 
2
 Although not currently incarcerated by the state of Utah, Defendant is in the custody 
of the United States Department of Homeland Security in Eloy, Arizona, as a result of the 
conviction and sentence. See Addendum C. 
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Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty pleas. R. 100-102; Addendum A. An appeal ensued 
to this Court on April 27, 2005. R.103-104. On July 5, 2005, this Court withdrew its sua 
sponte motion for summary disposition. See Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant is a 20-year old native and citizen of Turkey, who entered the United 
States with his father at age 8. He attended elementary through high schools in the United 
States - in California, and finally graduated from Cottonwood High School in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. He is a lawful permanent resident alien ("LPR") who acquired that status in 
2004 as a ward of the State of Utah through DCFS, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), 
after having demonstrated that his parents had abandoned him at the lonely age of 12. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). 
Defendant desires to join the United States Marines, as he is fluent in Turkish and English 
languages. R.71-72. 
The State alleges that on May 27, 2003, Defendant and two others robbed a Pizza 
Hut and stole items worth of over $5,000. See R.l-3, 112, at p.3. On November 19, 2004, 
Defendant entered guilty pleas to Burglary and Theft, both third degree felonies. R. 112, at 
p.4. The convictions entered against Defendant, without a doubt, render him deportable to 
Turkey as an "aggravated felon" to which there is no relief from deportation. R.72; see also 
INA §§ 237(a)(2)(a)(iii) & 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. §§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) & 1101(a)(43)(G); 
State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203, 73 P.3d 967 (discussing ramifications of an 
"aggravated felony" conviction), cert, granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Utah, Dec. 2003); Matter of 
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Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506(BIA 1992); J afar v. INS, 77 F.Supp.2d 360, 364-65 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (a sentence to one year term of imprisonment for petit larceny, while a 
misdemeanor under state law, is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes). See also, 
e.g., INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (which also renders defendant 
deportable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude ["CIMTs"] 
within five years of becoming an LPR). 
On or about March 4, 2005, the District Court sentenced Defendant to two 
indeterminate prison terms of zero to five years; however, the sentences were suspended in 
lieu of probation and thirty days in jail. R. 66-69. Defendant is currently detained by DHS 
in Eloy, Arizona. In fact, on July 15, 2005, an immigration judge ordered Defendant 
removed to Turkey as an "aggravated felon." See Addendum C. Defendant is also subject 
to other harsh penalties as an aggravated felon should he illegally re-enter the United States 
after deportation. See id; see also INA § 276(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 
Subsequent to sentencing, Defendant filed with the District Court a motion to 
withdraw guilty pleas on or about April 4, 2005, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 
(1953, as amended). See R.98-99. On April 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to 
withdraw the pleas as untimely. R. 101-102. This appeal then followed. R. 103-104. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court held in Rojas-Martinez that a non-citizen defendant is entitled to 
affirmative, sound legal advise regarding the immigration consequences of pleading guilty 
- 6 -
to a crime. Trial counsel in this case misadvised Defendant - a lawful permanent resident 
alien - regarding the immigration consequences of the pleas to two "aggravated felony" 
crimes which have now resulted in an immigration judge ordering Defendant removed from 
the United States to Turkey. However, Defendant, like most non-citizens charged with a 
crime, was unable to (and could not have) discern counsel's ineffectiveness until he was 
placed in removal proceedings by DHS. Upon finding out trial counsel's error, Defendant 
immediately moved to withdraw his guilty pleas because of counsel's ineffectiveness and 
the involuntariness of the pleas. 
Mechanically applying the rule that a motion to withdraw a plea must be filed before 
sentencing, the District Court denied defendant's motion as untimely and thus, in essence, 
thrust defendant into a post-conviction habeas corpus petition as the only other means to 
challenge the voluntariness of his pleas. By denying the motion to withdraw pleas, the 
district court abused discretion and committed reversible error because it failed to consider 
that Defendant is forever foreclosed from seeking to withdraw his pleas because he has been 
transferred out of the state of Utah and would therefore be unable to be present "in person" 
for dispositive hearings as required by the rules governing post-conviction petitions. 
Because the district court's decision essentially fails the test recently enunciated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Merrill - that a due process and equal protection violations 
occurs whenever a defendant is foreclosed from presenting issues relating to involuntariness 
of a plea to any forum - the district court must be reversed and the matter remanded for a 
- 7 -
hearing on the motion to withdraw pleas to determine if counsel's advice to Defendant on 
the immigration consequences of the pleas satisfies the Rojas-Martinez test. 
In remanding the matter, this Court need not find facially unconstitutional § 77-13-
6(2)(b), the enabling statute governing motions to withdraw a guilty plea. Rather, the Court 
will be harmonizing § 77-13-6, consistent with the due process and equal protection 
mandates of Merrill, with the procedural rules governing post-conviction petitions - Rule 
65C(k) - as requiring that a non-citizen defendant who has been ordered deported or exiled 
to another state by DHS must be allowed to withdraw a plea upon promptly filing such a 
motion when counsel's ineffectiveness is discovered. Such a reasonable time frame need 
not exceed ninety days, sufficient to allow the non-citizen to explore his options, seek 
counsel, and file a motion to withdraw plea. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the 
dictates of Merrill, and would render meaningless the core holding by this Court in Rojas-
Martinez that a guilty plea is infirm if counsel failed to properly advise a non-citizen of the 
immigration consequences of a plea. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED AS 
UNTIMELY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEAS FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD OF 
SENTENCING AND UPON DISCOVERING TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
INEFFECTIVENESS IN MISADVISING HIM OF THE 
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEAS, 
PARTICULARLY WHERE NO OTHER FORUM EXISTS FOR 
THE NON-CITIZEN DEFENDANT TO RAISE QUESTIONS 
- 8 -
RELATING TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS PLEAS OR 
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS. 
A. This Court and the United States Supreme Court have determined that 
non-citizen defendants must be correctly advised of immigration consequences of 
guilty pleas lest the pleas be found involuntary or counsel ineffective. 
The issues before the Court is of significant due process and equal protection 
importance. See,e.g., State v. Rojas, 2003 UT App. 203 (holding that defense counsel 
must correctly advice non-citizens of deportation consequences of guilty pleas); State v. 
Merrill, 2005 UT 34,114 P.3d 585, 2005 WL 1367368 (Utah, June 10, 2005) (noting that 
due process is violated when a class of defendants are deprived of a forum to assert 
defects in their guilty pleas). 
Against the backdrop of fervent congressional activities in criminal-immigration 
law, the United States Supreme Court in 2001 ruled on whether Congress in AEDPA3 
could retroactively bar deportation relief to LPRs who pleaded guilty to certain 
deportable offenses prior to the advent of the new immigration laws. In INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (2001),4 the Supreme Court discussed at length the 
importance of an informed plea discussion between non-citizen criminal defendants, their 
3
 Anti-Terroirsm and Effectcive Death Penalty Act, Publ L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (April 24,1996). 
4
 For a thorough analysis of the St. Cyr decision, see Ishola, INS v. St. Cyr: The 
Supreme Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-Immigration Laws, 14 Utah Bar 
Journal 9 (Dec. 2001). 
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attorneys, and the prosecution.5 The Supreme Court recognized that the nature and 
timing of plea agreements are very critical in determining whether a non-citizen who has 
committed a crime is deported or remains in the United States. See id. The St. Cyr Court 
finally laid to rest and rejected the argument that deportation is "prospective" or 
"collateral" and, as the argument further goes, whether an alien was not advised or 
misadvised of the immigration consequences of a plea does not implicate a guilty plea in 
a criminal proceeding: 
The INS argues that deportation proceedings (and the Attorney General's 
discretionary power to grant relief from deportation) are "inherently 
prospective" and that, as a result, application of the law of deportation can 
never have a retroactive effect. Such categorical arguments are not 
particularly helpful. . . . 
St Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324, 121 S.Ct. at 2292. The Court then discussed the importance of 
an effectively-counseled plea agreement between a non-citizen, the defense counsel, and 
the government: 
Plea agreements involved quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and 
the government. See Newton v. Pumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393, n.3, 107 S.Ct. 
1187, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987). In exchange for perceived benefits, 
defendants waive several of their constitutional rights (including the right 
to a trial) and grant the government numerous "tangible benefits, such as 
promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial 
resources." Id, 
Id., 533 U.S. at 322-323, 121 S.Ct. at 2291. The Supreme Court then reiterated the 
5
 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323, n. 48 (chronicling how the States have responded to 
dealing with the criminal aliens and guilty pleas). 
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importance of effective assistance of counsel at this stage of criminal proceedings, 
quoting with approval that "if a defendant will face deportation as a result of the 
conviction defense counsel should fully advise the defendant of these consequences." 
Id. at 323, n.51 (Citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 14-3.2 Comment, 75 (2d ed. 
1982) (emphasis supplied)). 
The foregoing lengthy discussion in St. Cyr of the importance of a plea agreement 
between non-citizen criminal defendants, their attorneys, and the prosecution is a 
recognition by the Court that, with the advent of IIRIRA6 the nature and timing of plea 
agreements become highly critical in determining whether a non-citizen who has 
committed a crime is deported or remains in the United States. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized that deportation under IIRIRA for an aggravated felon is no 
longer an academic exercise, for "[tjhere is a clear difference between facing possible 
deportation and facing certain deportation." Id, 533 U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2293. An 
"aggravated felon," as stated above, simply does not face deportation; rather, he or she 
faces, as the Supreme Court held, certain deportation because of the irrebutable 
presumption of deportability. See id. 
Furthermore, other appellate courts have recently ruled on the thorny question of 
the level of competent advice to be give a non-citizen criminal defendant at the guilty 
plea phase. See, e.g., State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967 (Utah). In In re Resendiz, 25 
6
 Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009(1996). 
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CaUth 230, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d at 445-46, 19 P.3d at 1185,7 a more recent and lengthy 
analysis by the California Supreme Court of the role of defense counsel during plea 
negotiations with a non-citizen, the court found that counsel's statement that defendant 
would have no immigration problems constitutes affirmative misrepresentation. See id.; 
see also Gonzalez, 83 P.3d 921, 924-25 (Ore. Ct. App.2004) ("Because the current 
immigration scheme all but requires that aliens convicted of aggravated felonies be 
deported, we conclude that Petitioner's trial counsel was obligated to tell Petitioner that 
he was pleading guilty to an aggravated felony and that, unless the United States 
Attorney general or his designee chose not to pursue deportation proceedings against 
Petitioner, he would be deported as a result of his guilty plea."). 
Defense counsel's statement in the instant case that Defendant "may not" be 
deported" as a result of pleading guilty to two aggravated felony offenses is on par with, 
and indistinguishable from, counsel's statement in Gonzalez that Petitioner "may" be 
subject to deportation. Both statements were patently calculated by counsel to mislead, 
and to avoid and deflect responsibility — the responsibility to investigate and research 
the nature of the potential conviction, its characterization under federal criminal-
immigration law, and its impact on defendants' contemplated plea. 
B. As Applied, the District Court's Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(b) as precluding Defendant's motion to withdraw pleas filed 
7
 Although decided some few months before St. Cyr, Resendiz portends what was 
to come in the former, reaching the same doctrinal conclusion on the importance of well-
informed plea bargain between counsel and a non-citizen defendant. See 25 Cal. 4th at 230. 
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within a reasonable period after sentencing violates Due Process and 
Equal Protection Because There is No Other Forum in Which 
Defendant Could Assert the Involuntariness of His Guilty Pleas and 
Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel Once He is Exiled by DHS to Arizona 
and/or Expeditiously Removed from the United States and thus 
Cannot Be "Present" for His Post-Conviction Relief Hearing as 
Required by Rule 65C(k). 
1. As Applied Due Process Violation 
Due Process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed a crime in order to sustain a conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 361-63, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). Due process also requires that if the defendant does 
not hold the State to its requisite burden of proof and instead pleads guilty, it is axiomatic 
that the guilty plea itself must be knowingly and voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969). As the Supreme Court noted in Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938), 
A defendant who enters such a plea [a guilty plea] simultaneously waives 
several constitutional rights, including his privilege against self-
incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his 
accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must 
be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege. 
Because there are questions regarding whether Defendant's pleas were knowing 
and voluntary and whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to apprise 
him of the deportation consequences of the pleas, this Court must find that, as applied, 
the requirement of § 77-13-6(2)(b) is directory and immediately remand the case to 
decide whether Defendant's pleas were voluntary before he is expeditiously removed 
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from the United States and loses the right to challenge his conviction under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, for he would unable to be "present" at his hearing as required 
by Rule 65C(k). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101; Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(k). The court 
in Johnson provides further guidance on the due process of law required for guilty pleas, 
stating, 
[I]f a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has 
been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, 
because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal 
criminal charge, it cannot truly be voluntary unless the defendant possesses 
an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. 
Id. at 466; see also Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (referring to due 
process in a criminal proceeding as a fundamental right); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 
329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572 (1941) (noting that a plea cannot be voluntary unless the 
defendant received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and 
most universally recognized requirement of due process."). 
As further elucidated below, non-citizen defendants, like Defendant, do not have a 
means by which they can re-appear before the trial court and have these due process 
rights enforced if they do not file a motion to withdraw their pleas immediately upon 
discovering counsel's ineffectiveness and commencement of removal proceedings, and 
are immediately deported from the United States pursuant to federal immigration laws. 
See INA §§ 237, 238, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1228 (mandating expeditious removal of 
aggravated felons). Thus, interpretation by the district court of § 77-13-6(2)(b), which 
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the court found as barring her from hearing the "untimely" motion to withdraw pleas for 
this non-citizen Defendant, violates due process since the court has not determined 
whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. 
2. Equal Protection Violation 
In addition, the district court's interpretation of § 77-13-6(2)(b) violates equal 
protection and uniform operation of laws by differentiating between defendants who can 
withdraw their illegally-obtained pleas based solely on the time at which the defendant 
files a motion to withdraw. The Equal Protection clause provides protection to all 
persons similarly situated. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 24. 
When legislation creates classifications that impinge upon a fundamental interest, the 
statute is upheld only if it furthers a compelling state interest. See State in the Interest of 
MR., 967 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Utah App. 1998); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62, 
100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980) (strict scrutiny test requires that "the legislation be finely tailored 
to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it 
draws must be carefully scrutinized"); Mohi, 901 P.2d at 995 (statute must be reasonable 
in relation to state's need to enact it). 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution similarly requires that all laws have 
uniform operation. See Utah Const, art. I, § 24. At least in the context of economic 
legislation, this constitutional protection is as rigorous as the protection provided by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). The 
Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the tests of "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" 
are not helpful in assessing whether legislation violates the uniform operations of the law 
provision. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc±, 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995). 
Rather than employing strict scrutiny or rational basis tests, the analysis for determining 
whether a statute violates Article I, section 24 is "(1) whether the classification is 
reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (3) whether there is 
a reasonable relationship between the two." Id. at 426 (citing Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 
637). 
The right in a criminal case to have the state prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the concomitant due process right to be convicted of a crime based on a plea * 
of guilty only when the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, are of fundamental 
importance. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 (referring to deprivation of due process in a 
criminal proceeding as a fundamental right); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, *f20, 5 P.3d 
616 ("A just and peaceful society must secure by law the fundamental rights of all its 
citizens"; these fundamental rights include criminal law sanctions); accord State v. 
Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585, 2005 WL 1367368 (Utah). Moreover, these due 
process rights directly implicate the right to liberty and therefore are fundamental. See 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919 (1991) (further citation 
omitted) ("Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the 
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Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional 
guarantees."). Because, as applied here, the ruling in the district court directly subjugates 
a non-citizen criminal defendant's exercise of his due process rights and liberty interests 
to the requirement provided by § 77-13-6(2)(b), the statute is subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny under equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc^ 
903 P.2d at 426. 
The State clearly does not have a compelling need to limit the time in which a 
non-citizen defendant can move the court to withdraw an illegal plea to before sentence 
is pronounced. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the state's interest in 
limiting the time in which a defendant can challenge a due process violation is not 
significantly compelling to warrant the imposition of a statute of limitations of habeas 
petitions. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. The Court's statement in Julian that "if the 
proper showing is made, the mere passage of time can never justify continued 
imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights, regardless of how 
difficult it may be for the State to re-prosecute the individual" resolves the question of 
whether the State has a compelling interest that would justify the classification. Id. 
Because the state's interest in reprosecuting the individual in a speedy fashion does not 
justify a time limit on claiming a deprivation of fundamental rights, section 77-13-6(2)(b) 
violates equal protection. 
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Application of Article I, Section 24 uniform operations of the law test also 
demonstrates that the district court's interpretation of § 77-13-6(2)(b) is unconstitutional 
as applied here. If the requirement to file a motion to withdraw plea under § 77-13-
6(2)(b) were considered jurisdictional, the statute would violate uniform operation of 
laws with respect to non-citizen defendants. First, the statute would classify those 
defendants who can obtain immediate relief from an unconstitutional plea through a 
motion to withdraw and/or post-conviction relief, and those who cannot as a result of 
alienage and because of rapid exile or deportation from the United States by DHS. 
The classes would be subjected to significantly disparate treatment, not only 
because of the passage of time a defendant may spend incarcerated while going the more 
circuitous route through appeal and post-conviction proceedings, but also because the 
post-conviction statute and its concomitant procedural rule require that the habeas or 
post-conviction petitioner be "present" all hearings on dispositive motions. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-101; Rule 65C(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition, the legislative objectives are not compelling. There is no reasonable 
objective to warrant such disparity between citizen defendants who may file motions to 
withdraw pleas and also seek post-conviction relief, and non-citizen defendants who may 
not file such a motion or post-conviction petition because of expedited removal 
proceedings and state procedural law mandating their presence on all dispositive motions 
when, in all reality, such non-citizens shall remain in the custody of DHS throughout 
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removal proceedings until they are ordered deported by an immigration judge. See IN A 
§ 236©), 8 U.S.C. § 1226©); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (2003) 
(finding that mandatory detention of non-citizens in "civil" immigration proceedings 
does not violate due process). 
Again, while the Supreme Court has acknowledged the state's concerns about the 
increased difficulty in prosecuting a case after time has elapsed, it has specifically 
rejected the notion that such increased difficulties establish an adequate basis for 
depriving an individual of fundamental rights based solely on the passage of time. See 
Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. In this particular case, the requirement that a motion to 
withdraw a plea be filed prior to sentencing by a non-citizen defendant unaware of 
counsel's ineffectiveness until removal proceedings are commenced is acutely unfair and 
deprives the non-citizen defendant of fundamental rights simply because of alienage, as 
he could be exiled or deported before commencement of a lengthy post-conviction relief 
petition. Further, because the post-conviction law requires that the petitioner be present 
in court on dispositive motion, the State has by all means foreclose all avenues in which 
a non-citizen defendant in removal proceedings may seek to challenge the voluntariness 
of his guilty plea or allege counsel's ineffectiveness. 
Defendant reiterates that he raises no wholesale, facial constitutional challenge to 
§ 77-13-6. Axiomatically, whenever possible, a statute must be interpreted so as not to 
conflict with constitutional requirements. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1009. The 
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district court's interpretation of § 77-13-6(2)(b) violates due process and equal protection 
for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, that interpretation should be rejected and this 
Court should hold that the requirement that a motion to withdraw pleas as provided by § 
77-13-6(2)(b) is directory only and in no way creates a jurisdictional bar to a trial court 
hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for a non-citizen defendant who, as this Court 
found in Rojas-Martinez, is entitled to sound legal advise on the immigration 
implications of a guilty plea, who is usually unaware and thus unable to assert that right 
until DHS commences removal proceedings, and who may forever be barred from 
asserting the right in any forum because of exile to another state or expedited removal 
from the United States by DHS, and thus cannot be "present" in PCRA proceedings as 
required by Rule 65C(k). 
The same concerns that led the Supreme Court to reject the statute of limitations 
in habeas cases apply in the instant case. Precluding a trial court from hearing a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea entered in that court "remove[s] flexibility and discretion from 
state judicial procedure, thereby diminishing the court's ability to guarantee fairness and 
equity in particular cases." Julian, 966 P.2d at 253 (citation omitted). Just as the writ of 
habeas corpus provides an essential protection of fundamental rights and offers a remedy 
for violations of due process, a trial court's authority to withdraw an unconstitutional 
plea, particularly when the request is made within 90 days or a reasonable period after 
sentencing, protects fundamental rights by providing a remedy for violations of due 
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process that occur in taking pleas. Phrased differently, allowing a trial judge to hear a 
meritorious motion to withdraw a plea when the motion is filed within 90 days of 
sentencing allows the judicial branch to fulfill its role as a distinct and separate branch of 
government and its duty to fairly and equitably administer justice. 
Most importantly, when a plea is taken in direct violation of due process, a 
defendant has been wrongfully incarcerated and any failure to re-examine the conviction 
would be unconscionable. Id. at 253. Since "the mere passage of time can never justify 
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental rights" (id.), a 
non-citizen defendants must be given some access to the courts in order to challenge his 
convictions obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. 
3. Recent Utah supreme court decision supports Defendant's position 
Admittedly, just a few months ago, in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585, 
2005 WL 1367368, rebuffing a due process challenge to the thirty-day limitations period 
in former § 77-13-6,8 the Utah supreme court found that the statute is jurisdictional and 
facially constitutional. However, the Court stated that "[w]hile an unknowing or 
involuntary guilty plea is likely to constitute a denial of due process, an absolute 
prohibition against providing a forum to a defendant in which he may assert defects in 
his guilty plea would certainly violate due process guarantees" Id., ff 8-9, 114 P.3d at 
8
 Section 77-13-6 has been significantly amended since Merrill For the purposes 
of the instant case, the statute now requires a motion to be filed prior to sentencing, as 
opposed to within thirty days of entering a plea. See UCA § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2005). 
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592, 2005 WL 1367368, at * 6 (emphasis added). 
With respect to the equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court in Merrill also 
noted that "some access to the courts for the purpose of reviewing the lawfulness of a 
guilty plea is a fundamental right." Id., 113, 14 P.3d at 592, 2005 WL at *9. The Court 
goes on to state that members of the class covered by the statute joined the class by 
choice: 
Section 77-13-6 extends to each of these defendants the opportunity to 
obtain relief from the consequences of his plea by filing a motion within 
thirty days of a final judgment. No defendant is consigned to the 
disadvantaged class merely because he pleaded guilty. Instead, each enjoys 
an equal opportunity to avoid whatever disadvantages might attend the 
PRCA by moving to withdraw his guilty plea within the thirty-day statutory 
period. In this way, the classification created by the statute is conditional 
and contingent, and membership in the class is voluntary. It "applies 
equally" to all defendants who plead guilty, including those whose guilty 
pleas were unlawfully obtained or who, for some other reasons, may be 
entitled to withdraw their pleas. 
Id, Tfl3 (emphasis supplied). 
Merrill, as earlier stated, is distinguishable from the instant case in that Merrill 
dealt with a citizen defendant who was not subject to deportation and may be "present" at 
dispositive PCRA proceedings as required by Rule 65C(k). On the other hand, the 
instant case crystalizes the dilemma of a non-citizen criminal defendant attempting to 
withdraw a guilty plea, but who was unaware of counsel's ineffectiveness prior to 
sentencing and entering of judgment, and who is forever foreclosed from seeking to 
withdraw his pleas as a result of expeditious deportation from the United States or, as 
- 2 2 -
here, one exiled to another state and thus cannot be "present" for PCRA proceedings. It 
is axiomatic that most non-citizen defendants are usually unaware of the deportation 
consequences of their guilty pleas until DHS files a detainer9 and commences removal 
proceedings. See,e.g., United States v. Singh, 305 F.Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004); 
Affidavit of Hakeem Ishola, attached as Addendum E [previously attached as Addendum 
A to defendant's opposition to sua sponte motion for summary disposition]. Further, it 
is a "conviction" as defined by federal immigration laws that triggers removal 
proceedings. See INA §101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) ("the term 
'conviction' means, with respect to an alien, . . . a judge or jury has found he alien or 
guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. . ."); Lujan-Armendariz 
v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, the filing of a notice of appeal in an appeal 
of right (direct appeal) ordinarily stays a non-citizen's deportation, whereas the filing of a 
post-conviction petition - the so-called collateral challenge - as contemplated in PCRA 
does not. In other words, an appealed judgment to the first appellate court is not 
considered a "conviction" for immigration purposes whereas a post-conviction petition is 
given no weight in removal proceedings. See,e.g., Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 
1971); Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Thomas, 21 I. & N. Dec 
20, 21 n.l (BIA 1995). The fact that immigration laws render deportable aliens who are 
9
 "The INS (now DHS) often places a notice with federal or state prison officials 
called a "detainer," requesting the Bureau of Prisons or its equivalent to notify INS if they 
intend to release the detained alien or hold the alien for INS. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 287.7. 
Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook 216 (8th ed. 2002). 
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collaterally attacking their convictions in a habeas petition but not those who have filed 
direct appeals of their convictions is further indicative of the need to allow non-citizens 
who have been erroneously convicted to withdraw their pleas upon promptly 
demonstrating the involuntariness of the pleas. 
In sum, most non-citizen defendants are unaware of the deportation consequences 
of their guilty pleas until DHS files a detainer and commences removal proceedings after 
a judgment is obtained. This Court has found that counsel may be constitutionally 
ineffective and thus guilty pleas involuntary for failure to advise a non-citizen of 
deportation consequences of a plea. See Rojas-Martinez, supra. By requiring a non-
citizen defendant to move to withdraw his pleas prior to sentencing and prior to being 
aware of the possibility of deportation and ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the 
amended § 77-13-6 puts the cart before the horse, and impermissibly denies this class of 
people due process and equal protection. Therefore, unlike Merrill, Defendant belongs 
to a discrete and insular minority class who is deprived of the right to assert defects in 
their pleas in any forum. See Merrill, supra. 
Phrased differently, Defendant believes that non-citizens defendants, like him, are 
denied any forum to challenge the voluntariness of their pleas because the statute now 
requires that a guilty plea be withdrawn prior to sentencing (not within "30 days of a 
final judgment" as contemplated by Merrill), and the concomitant procedural rules 
requiring PCRA petitioners be present clearly forecloses any forum for the non-citizen 
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aggravated felon who is either in DHS custody in another state or has been expeditiously 
removed from the United States. Therefore, the requirement that a motion to withdraw a 
plea be filed before sentencing works particular hardship on a non-citizen criminal 
defendant and prevents him from a forum to seek redress as the non-citizen is usually 
deported immediately upon entering a plea and being found by the immigration judge to 
have been "convicted," and has not filed a direct appeal. See, e.g., Addendum D (IJ 
ordering defendant removed to Turkey as a result of two aggravated felony convictions). 
Accordingly, because a post-conviction petition may exonerate a citizen and 
erases the stigma of conviction, a non-citizen defendant does not enjoy that benefit as he 
would have been deported with no opportunity for further relief The difference, 
therefore, between the treatment of a citizen and non-citizen under § 77-13-6 and the 
PRCA highlights the denial of a uniform operation of the law to the former. 
CONCLUSIONS AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons specified above, this Court should reverse the decision of the 
district court and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of August, 2005. 
ISHOLA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneysfor Defendant- Appellant 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening 
Brief was mailed by first-class postage prepaid this Jv^day of August, 2005, to: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Matthew D. Bates 
Assistant Attorneys General for the State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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Addendum "A" 
Memorandum Decision of the District Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, : MINUTE ENTRY and DECISION 
: DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
vs. : WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS/WRIT OF 
: CORAM NOBIS 
VIDARKILICER, : 
Defendant. : Case No.: 041904765 
: Judge Denise Posse Lindberg 
TJ1 Before the court is Defendant's April 8, 2005 motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. On 
November 14, 2004 defendant entered guilty pleas to one count of Burglary, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-202, and to one count of Theft, also a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404. On March 4, 2005 defendant was sentenced to two 
indeterminate terms of 0-5 years at the state prison. That prison term was stayed and Defendant 
was placed on supervised probation through Adult Probation and Parole, subject to his serving 
30 days in jail and completing other conditions of probation. Defendant has now completed his 
30-day jail term but remains incarcerated at the Summit County Jail as a result of a detainer 
lodged by the Department of Homeland Security. Defendant faces removal proceedings as an 
"aggravated felon" as a result of these convictions and is now subject to deportation under 
applicable laws of the United States. Defendant claims that at the time he plead to these crimes, 
he was not aware that the crimes would be grounds for deportation and further that his plea was 
the result of misinformation provided by his counsel at his pleading colloquy. 
%2 Defendants do not have an unqualified right to withdraw their guilty pleas. Pursuant to 
Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(a), a guilty plea may be withdrawn only upon leave of Court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. More importantly for present purposes, 
under subsection (2)(b) of that section, "[ajrequest to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made 
by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2004) (emphasis added). 
Following pronouncement of sentence, the Court loses jurisdiction to address plea issues except 
for correction of an illegal sentence under Utah R. Grim. P. 22(e). See, e.g., Utah v. 
Tarnawiecki, 5 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 2000. The sentence imposed in this case was not 
an illegal sentence subject to correction under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). In fact, Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e) expressly provides that "[ujnless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea." * 
1
 Deportation is a "collateral consequence" of conviction. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 
1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Although an attorney's failure to advise a defendant of the 
possibility of deportation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, icl, an affirmative 
f3 Defendant's reliance on State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
is misplaced, hi that case, Rojas-Martinez timely filed his motion to withdraw the plea under 
then-existing law. However, in 2004 the Utah legislature amended § 77-13-6 to provide 
expressly that withdrawals of pleas may be made, if at all, only up to the time of sentencing2 
Here, Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was filed more than a month after he was 
sentenced. Under § 77-13-6(2)(c), Defendant's only remedy lies under the Utah Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Tf4 Defendant also brings this motion pursuant to a "writ of coram nobis." A writ of coram 
nobis seeks review of a judgment on the ground that judgment would not have been rendered but 
for mistakes of fact which were unknown to the trial court and the parties. State v. Woodward, 
108 Utah 390, 391, 160 P.2d 432,433 (1945). See also Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85; 448 
P.2d 907 (Utah 1968). Coram nobis is a limited remedy of narrow scope and is available, where 
no other remedy exists, to correct errors of fact, not errors of law. Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 
787 (Utah 1986). As noted in the preceding paragraph, § 7^-13-6(2)(c) expressly provides for a 
remedy under Utah law; accordingly, relief by writ of coram nobis is unavailable.3 The motion is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2005. 
Demse Posse LindJ^gTThird District Court Judge 
\ 
misrepresentation of deportation consequences has been found to be ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Rojas-Martinez, 73 P.3d 967, 969 (Utah Ct App. 2003). 
2
 Except in pleas in abeyance, not at issue here, in which case a defendant must move to 
withdraw his plea, if at all, within 30 days from the time he pled guilty. 
3
 It is unclear whether Utah law still recognizes the writ of coram nobis. According to Black's 
law dictionary, this writ was abolished by adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and superseded by 
relief provided by that rule. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.).at 304-05. Given that Utah's rules 
of civil procedure, including R. 60(b), are modeled on the federal rules, and that all reported 
Utah cases discussing this writ predate the adoption of the current rules, it may well be that the 
writ is no longer available. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 14 day of April , 2005,1 mailed a tme and correct 
copy of the foregoing notice concerning disposition of funds, postage prepaid thereon, to the 
following: 
Clark A. Harms 
Deputy District Attorney 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hakeem Ishola 
Ishola Law Firm, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
716 East 4500 South, Suite-142 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
U DEPT/TY" CLERK 
Addendum "B" 
Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VIDARKILICHER, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 041904765 FS 
Appellate Case No. 20050406-CA 
CHANGE OF PLEA NOVEMBER 19,2004 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
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For 
For 
the 
the 
SALT LAKE 
JUDGE 
Plaintiff: 
Defendant: 
THE COURT: 
CITY, 
DENISE 
UTAH - NOVEMBER 19, 2004 
P. LINDBERG PRESIDING 
Patricia Parkinson 
John D. 
And we have 
O'Connell, Jr 
Mr. Kilicher 
• 
set for 
disposition. 
MS. PARKINSON: Your Honor, if I may approach, I have 
an amended information. 
THE COURT: All right. And under this amended 
information that the State has just filed with the court, Mr. 
Kilicher is charged with one count of theft, a third degree 
felony, amended down from a first. 
MR. O'CONNELL: I'm not sure - there's a count theft 
and a count burglary. 
THE COURT: And a count of burglary. Sorry, I missed 
that, also is a third degree felony. 
MR. O'CONNELL: Right. 
THE COURT: And is it Mr. Kilicher's intention to 
plead to these matters? 
MR. O'CONNELL: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And has Mr. Kilicher had a chance to 
review the Statement of Defendant? 
MR. O'CONNELL: He has. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Kilicher? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Did you read it personally or have it reao 
to you? 
THE DEFENDANT: I followed along as he read it to me. 
THE COURT: Did you understand everything that was 
covered? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have any remaining questions that ] 
can answer for you about anything in there? 
THE DEFENDANT: The only question I have is this 
person in here? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Oh, I'm prepared to answer that. He's 
just wondering (inaudible) the information. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, the evidence obtained, Ms. 
Martinez Cruse. I'm curious about that. 
THE COURT: I'm afraid I would not have any 
information to give you on that. 
MR. O'CONNELL: And I probably don't either. It 
really has no effect on the plea (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Right. Mr. Kilicher, you are pleading to 
two counts, each of which could carry penalties of up to five 
years in prison and fines of $5,000 plus an 85 percent 
surcharge and those could be run consecutive to each and 
cumulative in terms of the fines. Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: By your plea you would be admitting that 
1 on or about May 27 of 2003 at 5575 South 900 East in Salt Lake 
2 County, you obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
3 property of Pizza Hut with the purpose of depriving the owner 
4 of the value of that property; that the value of that property 
5 was a thousand, between a thousand and $5,000. And also that 
6 on or about that same date and location you entered or remained 
7 unlawfully in the building of another with intent to commit a 
8 theft. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: I don't know about that, I didn't 
10 enter the building. 
11 MR. O'CONNELL: Just a second. He wasn't the one that 
12 actually entered. He assisted another who he drove -
13 THE COURT: Okay, so that charge is as a party. 
14 MR. O'CONNELL: As a party. 
15 THE COURT: Party liability. Do you understand that 
16 if you aided and abetted and assisted in that then you are 
17 charged with the same. 
18 Oh, yes, this was you and your buddies. You are the 
19 one that is living with - is it Mr. Bradford? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Kilicher, have you had enough time to 
22 discuss this matter with your attorney? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice you 
25 received? 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Are you being forced in any way into this 
3 plea? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
5 THE COURT: Has anything else been promised to you? I 
6 mean you've already received a substantial reduction through 
7 the amendment. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
9 THE COURT: Are you today under the influence of 
10 anything that would affect your ability to enter this plea? 
11 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
12 THE COURT: Then how do you plead to this count -
13 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
14 THE COURT: - these two counts theft and burglary? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty on all. 
16 THE COURT: If you would go ahead and sign. 
17 Alright, Mr. Kilicher, I'm going to accept your plea 
18 as a knowing and voluntary plea. If you would go ahead and 
19 sign the form if you haven't already. Oh, you did. 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Never mind, I'm signing it. Of course you 
22 did. You have until the day of sentencing as the maximum time 
23 to withdraw the plea. 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: You would have to give me a good reason in 
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writxng on why you would want me to withdraw the plea. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll refer you for a pre-
sentence report. 
And I'm going to need to have him waive the time 
because of the holidays. 
MR. O'CONNELL: That's fine, Your Honor. That would 
be our preference too. 
THE COURT: We'll set this for January 7th. You'll 
have to report to AP&P within the next two or three business 
days and I'll see you on the 7th. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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Addendum "D" 
Court of Appeals Order Withdrawing Sua Sponte Motion to Dismiss 
UTAHAPPLu^.;. 
JUL 0 5 2005 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Vidar Kilicer, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20050406-CA 
This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for 
summary disposition.1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition is withdrawn, and a ruling on the issues raised 
therein is deferred pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. See Utah R. App. P. 10. 
Dated this _5L day of July, 2005. 
FOR THE COURT: 
fT0figBP3>~-\^ 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Kilicer also filed a motion to file an overlength memorandum. 
That motion is resolved through this order and the entire 
memorandum was considered. 
Addendum "E" 
Affidavit of Hakeem Ishola filed with Response to Sua Sponte Motion to 
Dismiss 
Hakeem Ishola, Utah State Bar #5970 
ISHOLA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
716 East 4500 South, Suite N142 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 269-9541 
Facsimile: (801)269-9581 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, AFFIDAVIT OF HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
: Lower Court No. 041904765 
VIDAR KILICER, Ct. App. No. 20050406-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Hakeem Ishola, under the penalty of perjury as provided in relevant United States Codes, 
deposes and states as follow: 
1. I am a licensed attorney in Texas and Utah, and I am also licensed before the United 
States Supreme Court, and several United States District Courts and United States Courts of Appeal. 
2. I have practiced criminal and immigration law since 1991. I have appeared in numerous 
criminal matters in federal/state courts and immigration courts Nationwide. I have appeared before 
United States District Courts and Court of Appeals throughout the Nation. I have litigated before 
the United States Supreme Court. I have successfully by myself or with other attorneys represented 
clients on serious criminal and deportation matters, including death penalty matters. I have lectured 
on criminal-immigration law, and have published numerous articles on criminal-immigration law, 
such as Of Confrontation: The Right Not to be Convicted on the Hearsay Declarations of an 
Accomplice (1990 Utah Law Review); Of Conviction and Removal: the Impact of New Immigration 
Law on Criminal Aliens (Utah Bar Journal 1997); INS v. St. Cyr: Supreme Court and Draconian 
Criminal Immigration Law (Utah Bar Journal 2001); Representing Detained Aliens, to be published 
in Annual AILA Handbook (Summer 2005). I will be lecturing over 3000 immigration lawyers at 
the annual AILA summit to be held in Salt Lake City, Utah, this summer. 
3. Some of my most recent successful, published, precedent-setting court cases include INS 
v. Galvez-Letona (10th Cir. 2001); INS v. Insixignmy (District Court, Utah, 2000); State v. MohU 901 
P.2d 991,1009 (Utah 1995); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App. 203 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Raul 
Cruz-Garza v. AshcrofU P.3d _ , 2005 WL , Case No. 04-9508 (10th Cir., 2/2/2005). 
4. It has been my experience that most immigrants are not aware of the deportation 
consequences of their guilty pleas until they receive a detainer from the DHS and a notice to appear 
indicating commencement of deportation proceedings. I have inherited hundreds of cases from 
criminal defense lawyers in Utah and Texas where non-citizens were advised to plead guilty to 
clearly deportable offenses because the criminal defense lawyers are not current on the state of 
immigration laws. This is particularly true when the non-citizen is told he or she would only serve 
30 days in jail or less and will be released by the criminal court. Most non-citizens, in my 
experience, are not aware of what crimes constitute an "aggravated felony" under federal law. Nor 
are most criminal defense lawyers aware that certain misdemeanors and felonies under state law may 
constitute an aggravate felony for federal immigration law purposes. Even the most seasoned 
criminal defense attorneys in Utah, who will take the time to consult an immigration lawyer before 
advising their clients to plead to certain minor offenses, are always baffled about what crimes 
constitute an "aggravate felony." 
2 
5. It has also been my experience that when an aline files an appeal of right to an appellate 
court, DHS will not initiate proceedings while the appeal is pending. However, if an alien files a 
post-conviction petition for relief, DHS treats such a petition as collateral proceeding and will initiate 
removal proceedings. 
6. Further the affiant sayeth naught 
DATED this 14th day of June, 2005. 
Hakeem Ishola \ 
Affiant 
3 
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Relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
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Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital 
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United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
* l i Annotated 
•* Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital 
Crimes; Double Jeopardy; Self-incrimination; Due Process 
of Law; Just Compensation for Property (Refs & Annos) 
Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes; 
Double Jeopardy; Self-incrimination; Due JProcess.of Law; 
Just Compensation for Property 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
<This amendment is further displayed in five separate 
documents according to subject matter,> 
<see USCA Const Amend. V-Capital Crimes> 
<see USCA Const Amend. V-Double Jeopardy> 
<see USCA Const Amend. V-Self Incrimination> 
<see USCA Const Amend. V-Due Process> 
<see USCA Const Amend. V-Just Compensation> 
Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes 
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United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
*m Annotated 
-* Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
2% Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence. 
Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions 
for subdivisions XXI through XXIX are contained in this document. For text of section, historical notes, 
and references, see first document for Amendment VI. For additional Notes of Decisions, see documents 
for Amend. VI, ante and post.> 
Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions 
for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII are contained in this document. For text of section, historical 
notes, and references, see first document for Amendment VI. For additional Notes of Decisions, see 
documents for Amend. VI, ante and post.> 
Current through P.L. 109-52 (excluding P.L. 109-42, 109-43) approved 08-02-05 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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U.S.C.A. Const. A m e n d . X I V [jg 
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND l 4 < 0 ^ ° ^ 
IMMUNITIES; DUE - - • "
 W ^ T ™ " 
Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
Approx. 67 pages 
* 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Consti tut ion of the United States 
* l i Annotated 
* i i Amendment XIV. Cit izenship; Privileges and 
Immun i t ies ; Due Process; Equal Protect ion; Appor t ionment 
of Representat ion; Disqualif ication of Off icers; Public Debt ; 
Enforcement 
^ A M E N D M E N T X I V . C I T I Z E N S H I P ; PRIV ILEGES 
AND I M M U N I T I E S ; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL 
PROTECTION; A P P O I N T M E N T OF 
REPRESENTATION; D I S Q U A L I F I C A T I O N OF 
OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Sect ion 1 . All persons born or natural ized in the United States, 
and subject to the jur isdict ion thereof, are cit izens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi leges or 
immuni t ies of cit izens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of l i fe, l iberty, or proper ty , w i thout due 
process of law; nor deny to any person wi th in its jur isdict ion the 
equal protect ion of the laws. 
Section 2 . Representatives shall be apport ioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, count ing 
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians 
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation m rebetti'on, or other 
cr ime, the basis of representat ion therein shall be reduced in the 
proport ion which the number of such male cit izens shall bear to 
the whole number of male citizens twen ty -one years of age in 
such State. 
Section 3 . No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or mi l i tary, under the United States, or under any 
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U.C.A. 1 9 5 3 , Const- Ar t . 1 , § 12 
Sec 12 [Rights of accused persons] 
Approx 127 pages 
IB 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Ar t 1 , § 12 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Consti tut ion of Utah 
^ - * i Article I . Declaration of Rights 
yf • •Sec. 1 2 . [R ights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r ight to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel , to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against h im , to have a copy 
thereof, to test i fy in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against h im, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public tr ial by an impart ia l j u ry of the county or distr ict in which 
the offense is alleged to have been commi t t ed , and the r ight to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final j udgmen t , be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the r ights herein guaranteed The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself ; a wife shall not be 
compel led to test i fy against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wi fe , nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise ent i t led to a prel iminary 
examinat ion, the funct ion of tha t examinat ion is l imited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by s tatute Nothing in this const i tut ion shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as def ined by statute or rule 
in whole or in par t at any prel iminary examinat ion to determine 
probable cause or at any pretr ial proceeding wi th respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is al lowed as 
defined by s tatute or rule. 
Laws 1994, S J.R. 6, 5 1 . adopted at elect ion Nov 8 r 1994, eff 
Jan 1 , 1995 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Rights of defendant , cr iminal procedure, see § 77 -1 -6 . 
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U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 24 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
-•Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
* [ i C h a p t e L l 3 . Pleas (Refs & Annps) 
"•§ 7 7 - 1 3 - 6 . W i t h d r a w a l of plea 
(1) A plea of not gui l ty may be w i thdrawn at any t ime prior to 
convict ion. 
(2)(a) A plea of gui l ty or no contest may be w i thd rawn only 
upon leave of the cour t and a showing tha t it was not knowingly 
and voluntar i ly made. 
(b) A request to wi thdraw a plea of gui l ty or no contest , except 
for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by mot ion before 
sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced 
unless the mot ion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a 
mot ion to w i thdraw the plea shall be made wi th in 30 days of 
pleading gui l ty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a gui l ty plea not made wi th in the t ime 
period specified in Subsection (2 ) (b ) shall be pursued under 
Title 78 , Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act , and Rule 
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c 6 5 , § 1; Laws 1994, c 16, 
§ 1; Laws 2003 , c 290 , § 1, eff. May 5, 2003 ; Laws 2004, c 90 , 
§ 9 1 , eff,._May__3, 2004. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003 , c 290 , rewrote this section tha t fo rmer ly prov ided: 
" (1) A plea of not gui l ty may be w i thdrawn at any t ime prior to 
convict ion. 
" (2) (a) A plea of gui l ty or no contest may be w i thd rawn only 
upon good cause shown and wi th leave of the cour t . 
"(b) A request to w i thdraw a plea of gui l ty or no contest is made 
by mot ion and shall be made wi th in 30 days af ter the entry of 
the plea. 
JJ, Prini"^3r^ rZ Tools 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78. Judicial Code 
Part IV. Particular Proceedings 
*ii Chapter 35A. Post-conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 78-35a-101. Short title 
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act." 
§ 78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted 
all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in 
Subsection (2) . Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition 
are found m Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22 (e) , Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
§ 78-35a-103. Applicability—Effect on petitions 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107, this chapter 
applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 1996. 
§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district 
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed m violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
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(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the 
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in 
an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate 
the conviction or sentence, because: 
(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the 
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; 
(II) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
( m ) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(IV) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner 
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of 
Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by 
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
§ 78-35a-105. Burden of proof 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent 
has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, but 
once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its 
existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
§ 78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction 
relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) (c) , a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over 
the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari 
is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry 
of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of 
certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
§ 78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief—Notice 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either: 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or 
sentencing proceeding as appropriate. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed 
for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice 
to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or 
sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during 
the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay 
and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the 
petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment, 
trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary. 
§ 78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be 
appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require an 
evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require 
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot 
be the basis for relief m any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
§ 78-35a-110. Appeal—Jurisdiction 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for 
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3. 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C 
C 
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings 
*r* -• RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and Venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the 
district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms 
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the 
wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality 
of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in 
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner; 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been 
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the 
results of the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other 
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the 
results of the prior proceeding; and 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence 
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous 
post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the Petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C 
case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in 
the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the 
petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in 
the normal course. 
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the 
court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on 
its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been 
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings 
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings 
of fact or conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and 
attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court 
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the 
petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not 
be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the 
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is 
a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or Other Response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after 
service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, 
the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and 
shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus 
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner 
may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered 
by the court. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise 
dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to 
delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the 
petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or 
video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not 
otherwise be present in court during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility 
where the petitioner is confined. 
(1) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a 
party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with 
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the 
respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; Stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 
days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the 
respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay 
of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and the 
court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems 
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and 
Sections 21-7-3 through 21-7- 4.7 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the 
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence, 
regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a 
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